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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Commissioner May Examine Taxpayer's Records for
Years Barred by Statute of Limitations Without
Proving Reasonable Suspicion of FraudUnited States v. Powell*
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has power to summon
witnesses and to examine records in order to ascertain the correctness of a taxpayer's return. 1 If a summons is not obeyed or if the
records sought are not produced, the Commissioner may seek
enforcement by applying to the proper federal district court.2
Although the Commissioner's investigative powers are broad, they
are not unlimited. In the absence of fraud, he must act within the
confines of a three-year statute of limitations.8 In addition, the Code
makes it abundantly clear that taxpayers may not be subjected to
unnecessary examinations or investigations• and that records sought
must be relevant or material.11
In each of the principal cases, taxpayer was summoned to produce
records for years which, in the absence of fraud, were no longer
subject to examination because of the running of the statute of
limitations. Upon taxpayer's refusal to produce his records, an
internal revenue agent petitioned a federal district court to enforce
the summons, claiming that examination was not foreclosed by the
statute of limitations because the taxpayer had filed a fraudu}t!nt
return. In issue in each of these cases was the question whether
records for years barred by statute may be examined by means of an
administrative summons if the issuing agent fails to disclose reasonable grounds for his suspicion of fraud. Prior to the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Ryan v. United States 6 and United States v.
Powell,7 holdings in cases dealing with this issue were in conflict.
In the Second8 and Sixth9 Circuits, an administrative summons
• !179 U.S. 48 (1964). A companion case was Ryan v. United States, !179 U.S. 61
(1964).
·
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
2. !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(b).
!I. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 650l(a), (c)(l).
4. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7605(b). "No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary
examination or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account
shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless
the Secretary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that
an additional inspection is necessary."
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
6. Ryan v. United States, !179 U.S. 61 (1964).
7. United States v. Powell, !179 U.S. 48 (1964).
8. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959); Norda Essential Oil &:
Chem. Co. v. United States, 230 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); United States v.
United Distillers Prod. Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946); In re Paramount Jewelry
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would have been enforced even in the absence of evidence to support
the agent's suspicion of fraud. The agent was required to prove
only that the summons was issued in good faith pursuant to
statutory authority and that the records sought were relevant or
material. Typical of the position of these circuits is the Sixth
Circuit's decision in the Ryan 10 case. In that case, an administrative
summons was enforced on the agent's statement that "reasonable
grounds exist for a strong suspicion that defendant ... has made a
fraudulent understatement of income." 11 No evidence was introduced
to support the agent's suspicion.
The First,12 Third, 13 Fourth,14 Seventh,15 and Ninth Circuits19
took a different position. They would not have enforced an administrative summons unless the agent disclosed facts indicating reasonable grounds for his suspicion of fraud.17 In the Powell case, the
Third Circuit refused to enforce a summons because no evidence
was introduced to support the agent's assertion that on the basis of
information obtained in investigation of the taxpayer's returns, he
had reason to suspect that fraudulent returns had been filed. 18
Similarly, in Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 19 the Ninth Circuit refused
to enforce a summons when the only reason given for suspecting
Co., 80 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Contra, In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc., ll9
F. Supp. 304 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
9. United States v. Ryan, 320 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1963), afj'd, 379 U.S. 61 (1964);
Eberhart v. Broadrock Dev. Corp., 296 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1962); Corbin Deposit Bank v. United States, 244 F.2d 177 (6th
Cir. 1957) (per curiam): Kumick. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1956);
Peoples Deposit Bank &: Trust Co. v. United States, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838 (1954). Contra, In the Matter of Wood, 130 F. Supp. 121 (W.D.
Ky. 1955).
10. Note 9 supra.
11. United States v. Ryan, 320 F.2d 500, 501 (6th Cir. 1963).
12. Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959); O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253
F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958).
13. United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914 (lid Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded, 379
U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Carey, 218 F. Supp. 298 (D. Del. 1963); Application
of Howard, 210 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 325 F.2d 917
(3d Cir. 1963); cf. Farmers' &: Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. United States, 11 F.2d 348 (lid
Cir. 1926).
14. Wall v. Mitchell, 287 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1961); In re Andrews, 18 F. Supp. 804
(D. Md. 1937).
15. McDermott v. Jifi.n Baumgarth Co., 286 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1961); United
States Aluminum Siding Corp. v. Eshleman, 170 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1958).
16. De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963); Boren v. Tuck.er, 239 F.2d
767 (9th Cir. 1956); Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942). The De
Masters court spoke in terms of "rational judgment" rather than "probable cause,"
but it seems to have required an equivalent level of proof. De Masters v. Arend, supra
at 88-90.
17. Although the Fifth Circuit has heard two cases dealing with the issue under
discussion, Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1956); Falsone v.
United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), its position is not clear.
18. 325 F.2d 914, 916 (3d Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
19. 128 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1942).
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fraud was that the return of the taxpayer's wife was being investigated. In both Lash v. Nighosian, 20 decided by the First Circuit,
and De Masters v. Arend,21 decided by the Ninth Circuit, administrative summonses were enforced. However, in these cases evidence
was introduced to support the agent's suspicion of fraud. In Lash,
the agent established that the taxpayer had made large, unsecured,
low-rate loans to agents who had previously audited his returns.
In De Masters, the agent testified that the increase in the taxpayers'
net worth plus their estimated living expenses exceeded their
reported income by more than ninety thousand dollars and that in
one year bank deposits of their business exceeded reported gross
receipts by more than seventeen thousand dollars.
In affirming the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ryan and reversing
the Third Circuit's decision in Powell, the Supreme Court held:
"[T]he Government need make no showing of probable cause to
suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question
that judicial enforcement of the administrative summons would
be an abusive use of the court's process, predicated on more
than the fact of re-examination and the running of the statute
of limitations on ordinary tax liability."22
In so holding, the Court relied heavily upon the legislative history
of section 7605(b) 23 and adopted several arguments previously
offered in support of the position of the Second and Sixth Circuits:
The Court felt that taxpayers must realize that fraudulent practices
will be discovered and penalized if our system of self-assessed revenue
collection is to operate effectively. Therefore, the Commissioner
must be freed from frustrating limitations upon his statutory duty
to administer the Internal Revenue Code. Proof of probable cause
is not necessary because such a requirement would curtail the
Commissioner's investigative power and hamper administration of
the Code.24 The taxpayer is still amply protected because enforcement of the summons will be denied if the investigation is made in
bad faith, if oppressive or abusive procedures are employed, or if
the records sought are neither relevant nor material.215 Finally, the
Court pointed out that other administrative agencies need not establish reasonable grounds for a suspicion of fraud in order to have
summonses enforced.26
20. 273 F.2d 185, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1959).
21. 313 F.2d 79, 83 (9th Cir. 1963).
22. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964).
23. Id. at 56.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
26. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57; see Administrative Procedure Act
§ 6(c), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1958); 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(a)-(c) (1958) (SEC); 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1958) (FTC); 49 Stat.
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These arguments are not convincing. According to the Powell
decision at the Third Circuit level, the issuing agent would be
required only to establish a reasonable basis for his suspicions in
order to have a summons enforced; he would not actually have to
prove fraud. Thus, the -Commissioner's investigative power would
not be significantly weakened, because enforcement of a summons
would be denied only if the agent were carrying on a mere exploratory fishing expedition. In addition, the taxpayer would be given
better protection because he could not be subjected to numerous
exploratory investigations even if such investigations were relevant
or material and made in good faith.
Although it is true that other administrative agencies need not
establish reasonable grounds for suspicion of fraud in order to have
an administrative summons enforced, it does not follow that this
rule should also apply to the Internal Revenue Service. Unlike the
Internal Revenue Service, other administrative agencies do not
operate within the confines of a provision such as section 7605(b) of
the Code, which prohibits unnecessary examinations.27 The predecessor of section 7605(b) was enacted in 1921 in order to meet the
objections of taxpayers that they were being subjected to onerous
and unnecessarily frequent examinations.28 Because the ordinary
individual will of necessity deal with the Internal Revenue Service
many more times during his life than he will deal with the other
agencies, it was natural for Congress to respond to his special
problems by enacting this unique provision. However, the Supreme
Court in Powell, relying mainly on passages from the congressional
debates, concluded that the primary purpose of section 7605(b) "was
no more than to emphasize the responsibility of agents to exercise
prudent judgment in wielding the extensive powers granted to them
by the Internal Revenue Code" and that "to import a probable cause
standard ... would substantially overshoot the goal which the legislators sought to attain." 29 Such a conclusion seems fallacious. The
debates on this point are, at most, equivocal.30 They indicate that
what is presently section 7605(b) limits the Commissioner to one
examination unless he indicates that there is a necessity for further
examination,31 but there is nothing in the debates or in the Senate
Report82 which indicates whal: is meant by the word necessity. On the
other hand, the one point that is clear from both the debates and the
856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825f(a)-(c)(l958) (FPC); Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations:
Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 Mrca. L. REv. 187 (1961).
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(b).
S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1921).
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 56 (1964).
See' 61 CONG. R.Ec. 5202, 5'855 (1921).
at 5855.
S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1921).

Ia.
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Senate Report is that the provision was enacted solely for the tax.payer's benefit and protection. By deciding as it did in, Ryan and
Powell, the Supreme Court seems to have ignored congressional
intent to protect the tax.payer and has reduced section 7605(b) to
little more than a passive reminder to the Commissioner that taxpayers do have some rights.
Finally, it should be noted that the fourth and fifth amendments
to the Constitution have afforded little protection to a taxpayer faced
with an administrative summons.33 The Supreme Court has held
that the fourth amendment does not apply to any records that an
individual is required by statute to keep34 and that the enforcement
of an administrative summons does not violate the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.85 Although the Supreme Court has not been faced with a tax case in
which the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
has been in issue, it appears that a taxpayer has no 'right to resist
government procurement of records required by law to be kept.86 As
a result, the taxpayer may be forced to reveal incriminating records.
But, by requiring, as a prerequisite to enforcement of an administrative summons, a showing of reasonable grounds for suspicion of
fraud, courts will be able to retain some of the philosophy behind
the enactment of the fourth and fifth amendments without seriously
hampering the collection of revenue.
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in the Powell case suggests what
seems to be the better criteria. In his opinion, re-examination of a
tax.payer's statute-barred records is "unnecessary" within the meaning
of section 7605(b) unless the court is shown that the taxpayer is not
being subjected to administrative fiat or capriciousness and there is
some evidence establishing a reasonable suspicion of fraud. 87 Such
a test would more properly balance the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the tax collection system with the individual
taxpayer's interest in freedom from unwarranted governmental
investigation.
33. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V. See United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336
U.S. 793 (1949); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Avakian, Searches and
Seizures, N.Y.U. 17rn INST. ON FED. TAX 531 (1959); Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and
Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, IO TAX L. REv. 191 (1954); Spilky, Have We Lost Our
Civil Rights in Tax Matters, 37 TAXES 603 (1959); Note, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 676 (1957);
1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 277.
34. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. I (1948).
35. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) . See generally
De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963); National Plate & Window Glass Co.
v. United States, 254 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1958).
36. See Note, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 676, 696-99 (1957).
37. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 59-60 (1964) (dissenting opinion). Mr.
Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Goldberg joined in the dissent in Powell. In the Ryan
case, Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, but Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Goldberg
concurred in the result because they felt that the Government had not acted
capriciously.

